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Psychobiographies are a blend of the oldest and newest of 
knowledge. Enhancing the surface analyses that have often marked 
past attempts to explain the story of a man's life, psychology 
brings a new element Into the picture. The Insights provided by 
this young science can be of great explanatlve value. The dangers 
of using such a new and subjective science are also great. The 
writer of psychobiographies has a particular responsibility to 
guard against biases, because of the enormous potential for abuse 
Inherent 1n the subjectivity of psychological theories. The 
psychoblographlcal approach with Its plusses and minuses 1s a 
central consideration of this paper.
Man Is by nature a complex animal. Psychology attempts to 
explain man's actions and motivations. Its contribution to the 
understanding of people 1s 1n providing a conceptual frame work 
based upon systematic observations. Psychology has Its drawbacks 
but there 1s no more appealing alternative. One may criticize the 
subjectivity that psychology Introduces Into one's work but words 
written by people, about people are never free of biases or of 
subjectivity. This paper will consider both the Insights which 
psychology 1s capable of bringing to history and the abuses to which 
1t 1s especially prone.
Henry Kissinger 1s a particularly apt subject for a psychoblo­
graphlcal study. He has had enormous Impact on foreign affairs and 
captured the attention of the American populace. The life-crises 
endured by Kissinger provide his biographers with numerous 
opportunities to look behind the facades of everyday life. Through 
the momentary gaffes and the transcendent tragedies of his life, 
this paper will examine Kissinger's Insecurities, h1s adaptability
and h1s need for creative successes to see as much as possible of 
the man that dominated American foreign policy through eight 
crucial years. The use of psychohlstorlcal techniques Is Intended 
to provide not only Insights Into his personality but will also 
help explain his whole philosophy of International politics and 
even h1s approach to the conduct of American foreign policy.
For as long as there have been famous people, there have been 
studies done on the course of their lives. One need not search 
far to find the reason for such studies. Entertainment, publicity, 
and an effort to maintain the memory of great men have all been 
Important at one time or another 1n the motivation of biographers. 
Another conslstant factor has been an effort to communicate why a 
particular man became a leader. The question of what makes a 
person "tick" lies at the root of biographies. A simple rendition 
of the events of a person's life 1s far from satisfactory; some 
conceptual framework 1s necessary to Integrate the many and varied 
elements of the subject's life. Authors have approached their studies 
from a number of different directions but the progression has been 
to examine more and more of the subject's personal life. The 
Intellectual biography has Its role In that 1t acquaints the reader 
with the mental output of the subject but 1t begs the question of 
environmental '"d personal factors that led to many of the theories 
simply recounted 1n such a study. Attempting to capture the pattern 
of thought Is a step 1n the right direction but why not look deeper 
Into the subject? Psychobiographies examine their subjects from a 
more detailed level. The Impact of personality 1s a factor deserving 
a great deal of consideration. Seemingly unreasonable antogonlsm
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toward objects or people that are Inexplicable In the light of 
logic and reason can often be resolved In terms of personality 
conflicts or other such psychologically based explanations. 
Utilizing psychology allows us to examine the most basic elements 
of a person and build from a firm foundation our theories on 
attitudes, development and behavior.
What advantages are derived from using psychology 1n the study 
of people's lives? The huge mass of reactions and behaviors that 
compose one's life 1s a product of the Interaction between 
environment and Internal factors. By establishing patterns of 
behavior and eliminating the transient events, we leave ourselves 
with the vital remainder that separates one man from another. For 
almost fifty years, psychology In the United States was satisfied 
on the whole with just this remainder. The reign of Behaviorism, 
from just before World War I until the 1£50'$, produced an almost 
complete lacKof Interest 1n the Internal workings of Individuals. 
The study of history paralleled this period In psychology by out* 
lining the stimuli and responses of our leaders without an 
examination Into the why's and wherefore's of the actions taken. 
Just as psychology rose above the primitive "black box" approach, 
so must history begin to transcend the shallow analyses of 
Individuals that do not draw upon the knowledge of psychology. 
There Is, In effect, the need for biographies and history In 
general to look at more than simple events; they must delve Into 
the Intra-psychic factors that produce these events.
There are unquestionable dangers Involved 1n decisions with 
respect to the veracity of documents and statements but the
-3-
alternative 1s even less palatable. The rather obvious advantages 
of using psychology as a tool In this process has already been 
grasped by a number of writers. The difficulty emanates from their 
lack of formal training and their consequent failure to employ the 
precepts of psychology 1n a systematic and meaningful fashion. The 
spotty results frequently encountered 1n psychohistories are more 
an Indictment of the manipulators of the science than of psychology 
Itself. One must employ psychology carefully because there are 
almost no hard and fast rules to follow. The 1nd1spens1b111ty of 
looking behind the masks of the players 1s what justifies the 
risks entailed In using psychology to study history.
The standards of success and failure for psychobiographies cannot 
rest solely upon their ability to predict the future actions of the 
subject studied. As pointed out previously, one of the Inputs that 
generate man's responses Is the environment In which he lives. These 
events are beyond the ability of man to predict. A more subtle 
difficulty 1s the Impact that these unpredictable events may have on 
an Individual. Similar environmental events can produce many 
responses depending upon a whole host of other external and Internal 
Inputs operant at the particular moment 1n question. The reader 
should understand that the ability to predict Isolated events In a 
person's life 1s beyond the ken of psychology as it is now understood. 
What then Is a good standard by which we can measure the validity of 
psychohistories?
Realistically, psychological studies can hope only to trace 
personality development by showing some consistency or pattern from
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the perspective of a generally accepted theory and use this theory 
and pattern to explain the seemingly Illogical actions an Individual 
may take. Some of the most Incomprehensible events throughout history 
become much more understandable If psychology 1s allowed to make Its 
contribution. Consider for a moment Hitler's declaration of war on 
the United States following Pearl Harbor. He was under no 
obligation to do so by any treaty with the Japanese and It allowed 
direct American participation In the European theater. What gain aid 
Hitler make by adding the United States to h1s 11st of belllgerant 
nations? Psychology might point out that among other motivating 
factors, Hitler's own personality contributed no small amount to 
this declaration of war. The same audlclty and confidence that led 
Hitler to power also spelled his ruin. He had come so far against 
such great odds that h1s belief In himself and by extension, h1$ 
people, caused him to lose the necessary grasp of reality that 
successful leaders must retain.
The standard of measure for a psychobiography should be Its 
ability to explain unusual events as well as normal ones, but how 
should we define Its failures? Unfortunately, the difficulties 
Involved in osychologlcal studies make defining their failure almost 
unnecessary. Let us examine some of the pitfalls of psychobiographies.
As a general rule 1t requires about seven to nine years to 
acquire a PhD in psychology and about the same length of time to 
become a Doctor in history. The fact that psychohistories fall 
between the two fields of study means that tremendous dedication 
Is necessary In order to master the uses of these two disciplines 
simultaneously. Each 1s sufficiently broad that only a small segment 
can become one's true area of expertise. What hope Is there that a
- 5-
writer can responsibly draw upon both fields of study? The body of 
literature 1n the psychoblographlcal field has a few shining examples 
of what can be achieved when an author or authors manage to meld 
material from both history and psychology,
Sigmund Freud and William Bullitt on Woodrow Wilson and the 
Erlkson books on Luther and Gandhi have shown the way for others to 
follow. Although these three books have shortcomings, they provide 
Important insights. The problem 1s that the majority of authors 
ettemptlng to use psychology in this sense have had no formal 
training. Their readers are often confronted with an Expert/
Neophyte situation where the writer loses his ability to focus on 
tiie key factors because he is unsure of his competence in applying 
his second field of expertise to the subject. The result is that 
the author will sometimes be unaware that much superior arguments 
could be made by looking at the subject from a different perspective.
Examples of this problem are not hard to find. Bruce Mazlish
wrote a book entitled Kissinger: The European Mind In American Policy
that attempted to use psychological theories to explain many of the
events in his subject's life. Mazlish is typical of the class of
writers that see the utility of psychology but who simply do not have
t.he necessary training to effectively use it. In fact, Mazlish is so
enamored with psychology that he sometimes forgets his first love,
history. In explaining the failure of Kissinger's "Year of Europe",
Mazlish makes a very complicated case for Kissinger viewing Europeans
0
as co-equals and hence the equivalent of siblings. He then attempts 
to link earlier statements to the effect that Henry and his brother
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Walter were sibling rivals to explain why Kissinger was unable to deal 
on an effective level with his European brothers. Thus, Mazlish 
indicates that the "Year of Europe" fell victim to Henry’s childhood 
rivalry with his brother. Had Mazlish adhered to his earlier training 
he might have found it more convincing to talk about the objective 
strains on Euro-American relations such as European unification, the 
American devaluation of the dollar and some sharply competetive trade 
policies, not to mention Vietnam or the October War in the Middle East. 
Sometimes one can be too clever; the relatively parsimonious explanation 
based upon historical facts is more convincing in this instance.
Aside from the difficulties inherent in mastering both history
and psychology there is the problem of subjectivity. Psych -logy, by
its very nature,regui res that some subjective judgments be made. Couple
this with the demands made upon those attempting to apply psychology
who are untrained and we have the setting for mistaken assertions.
Erik Erikson’s comment about Ernest Jones' interpretation of Gandhi’s
Salt March is illuminating. Jones felt that the Salt March was
symbolic of Gandhi's sexuality, orality and regression. Erikson
neatly sawed off the limb Jones was out on;
In the Immediate context of the chronic semi­
starvation that has undermined the vitality of 
tne Indian masses and considering the periodic 
threat of widespread death by famine, it would 
seem appropriate to assume, first of all, that 
salt means salt. 1
Dealing with biases is an obvious problem. An author can only 
hope to minimize the amount of parallax he brings to a psychological 
work; the remaining responsibility falls to the reader. Three
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important factors that are valuable in this effort are knowing some­
thing of the psychological theories involved, keeping a close eye 
on how well the writer allows his readers to validate his assertations 
and reading between the lines to investigate the author’s motives 
for writing the work in the first place.
Without a working knowledge of the science involved in a subject 
treated psychohistorically, the reader is utterly at the mercy of the 
author. Whatever question one may have as to whether or not psychology 
is a "true" science, the extensive use of terminology specific to 
psychology renders the point moot. If one picks up a book that draws 
on psychology, one must either know the technical phrases involved or 
lose the meaning of the author's words. Given the fact that many 
writers have not had formal training in psychology, the need for a 
reader to understand the principles of psychology is imperative.
This writer does not intend for the reader to feel that coursework is 
indicated in order to understand psychobiographies, only that one must 
be In a position to spot biases that are cloaked under technical names.
A Kissinger biographer, Bruce Mazlish, presents a fine example
of this phenomenon in his book on Kissinger. Mazlish endeavors to
use a Freudian construct, transference, to account for a gaffe by
Kissinger in his famous interview with Oriana Fallaci. In a
discussion of Kissinger's advisor, William Elliott, Mazlish offers
his readers the following:
His nickname of "Wild Bill" Elliott apparently 
suited him partly because of his boundless 
ambitions (“Wild Bill" also has a cowboy con­
notation-one thinks of Wild Bill Hickock riding 
into town, as in his Fallaci interview, may 
derive in part from this inspiration)
-8-
Neither the fact that this was not the manner in which Kissinger 
commonly referred to Elliott nor the fact that 1t had been twenty- 
two years since Kissinger's tenure as a tutee under Elliott slowed 
Mazlish in his use of a supposed transference. Is there an alter­
native to Invoking Freud's transference? A more reasonable ex­
planation than some form of transference is that Kissinger was 
trying to choose his words with an idea as to the target group that 
would eventually read them. The cowboy Imagery involved is very 
common 1n America, and Kissinger knew that his words would be read 
by a large number of Americans who hold such an Image 1n positive 
regard. This common-sense analysis coupled with an understanding of 
the meaning of transference would reveal the Invalidity of Mazlish's 
theory.
Dealing with contemporary figures almost necessitates interviews 
of persons acquainted with the subject. Erikson on Gandhi, Dana Ward 
Kissinger and any number of other authors have relied heavily upon 
such interviews. The difficulty lies 1n the need of the Interviewees 
for anonymity. This does not, however, mean that the reader can 
give the writer carte blanche with his interviews, The temptation 
to "interpret" the words of sources is unquestionably very great.
Er1k Erikson admits directly that he does not take anything resembling 
word-for-word notes during interviews. His excellent scholarly 
reputation and demonstrated knowledge of psychology justify the 
reader's trust in Erikson. One must keep in mind that such trust must 
be validated and earned.
Along with knowledge of psychological theories and the need to 
be aware of the value of sources cited, one must be conscious of the 
biases an author may bring to his work. This is the most basic form
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1of implicit psychology. Implicit psychology 1s the knowledge of the 
world and people that allow us to judge events. Although some might 
call It common sense, it has enormous value. Attitudes and judgments 
are Inescapable In our everyday world, so we are conditioned to take 
account of them. There Is sufficient room for subjective Interpretations 
1n psychobiographies to warrant a careful examination of the author's 
motives for writing the work. Knowing where an author 1s coming from, 
both geographically and professionally, can be of tremendous value in 
correcting for the subjectivity in a psychohistory. The axe an author 
has to grind can come from any of a number of different sources but 
It Is vital that the reader maintain constant vigilance for such biases.
As the body of knowledge 1n one's discipline continues to expand,
It almost necessitates a narrowing of one's field of expertise. The 
difficulty arises when one needs to develop an overall framework from 
which to analyze events or people. People, 1n particular, are complex 
subjects that defy shallow attempts at understanding. Ethical 
constraints on our ability to test theories by experimenting on 
people provide ample opportunity for Ihe survival of untestable 
theories. If Skinner could only have h^ (| a few hundred "non-human 
people", one feels that he might have shown the world how to love 
stimulus-response psychology, as he attempted in his^^tonal 
Walden Two. The end result of such a situation is that ore 1s forced
to pick and choose among various theories. This requires great care 
to avoid theoretical contradictions but the alternative, maintaining 
a strict adherence to Freud, Erikson or Skinner, also tends to hand­
cuff attempts to explain human actions. Freud was undoubtedly
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culture bound to some degree. It Is also unappealing to tie oneself
to Erikson's obligatory Identity Crisis. May not a leader know
who he 1s In relation to himself anJ his environment without some
sem1-myst1ca1 state of emotional prostration? Skinner long ago lost
h1s grip on psychological predominance when it became clear that
there are many Important non-re1nforced actions. Cognitive-orlented
psychologists love to circumscribe the Involvement of unconscious
motives 1n our behavior but there 1s little question that Freud had
the better explanations 1n some cases. It 1s worthy of repetition
that the room for subjective Interpretations Is enormous. Wielding
elements of many theories allows one to draw on the good and dispose 
»
of the bad In psychology.
The effectiveness of the critical framework developed above can 
be demonstrated by applying 1t to a recent psychobiography written 
by Professor Bruce Mazllsh. Published In 1975, h1s book Kissinger: 
The European Mind 1_n American Policy Is a close study of Kissinger's 
personality. Other works by Professor Mazllsh Include biographies 
entitled Search of Nixon and James and John Stuart Mill.
The Introduction to Mazllsh's Kissinger book sets out one of 
h1s reasons for choosing this particular subject to study. For 
Mazllsh, there was "the sheer fascination of his personality." He 
1s one of those figures, like Churchill or a de Gaulle, who bestride 
their eras and dominate by the sheer weight of their character.
The fact that Kissinger was a contemporary of Mazllsh's and had 
enormous power also drew Mazllsh to write on him. Professor Mazllsh
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makes his puint well when he catalogs the Impact Kissinger has had 
on American foreign policy and concludes, "We neglect to study and 
understand him at our own peril."'
Mazllsh however, may have had more than just these Interests 
In Kissinger. Mazllsh goes Into great detail to show the similarities 
between himself and h1s chosen subject. He Is accurate when he 
Informs his readers:
I, myself, am an Intellectual, Involved In the 
same academic milieu as my subject. My Interests 
have been in fields related to those of Kissinger's 
interest: if he wrote a doctoral dissertation
on the "conservative" settlement of 1815-1822, I 
did my thesis on "Burke, Bonald, and DeMalstre: A 
study In Conservatism"; 1f Kissinger wrote h1s 
senior thesis, The Meaning of History, on the 
philosophy of history, I wroTe a book called The 
Riddle of History, taking up the same subjectTTf 
ETssTnger has been absorbed with the revolutionary 
forces of history, I have taught and written on the 
subject of comparative revolution. We share many 
friends and acquaintances In Cambridge and 1n 
Washington, D.C. We are the same generation. 6
Thus, Mazllsh sees himself as very similar to Kissinger and 1f we
examine his text we observe that he questions why Kissinger was
chosen National Security Advisor 1n 1968. Mazllsh Indicates M s  attitude
toward this event, saying, "out of the blue, President-elect Nixon InvUed
Kissinger to a meeting at the Hotel Pierre."' Could It be that Mazllsh
1s jealous of the rise of a man so much like h1msr’ r7 Nixon's memoirs
describe the selection of Kissinger differently than does Mazllsh.
Nixon claims that Kissinger was secretly supplying him with Inside
information about the Vietnam negotiations from September 12 through
O
October 12, 1968. Also noteworthy was the fact that Nixon, along 
with thousands of others, was very Impressed with Kissinger's Nuclear
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Weapons and fpfetpn Policy. This gives the reader a much different 
picture than Mazlish's "out of the blue" description. The evaluations 
a reader would make of Kissinger on the basis of these two explanations 
differ substantially.
More evidence of Mazlish's jealousy of Kissinger builds a 
solid foundation for criticism of Mazlish's negative attitudes 
that dominate much of his book. His amazement at Kissinger's 
sudden elevation was grounded on the feeling that Kissinger had no
outstanding claim to Intellectual abilities that would have merited
»
bring nam^f National Security Advisor. In that same passage,
Mazllsh finally points out what he felt put Kissinger In power,
"If any single trait can be said to have carried Kissinger to the 
Secretariat of State, 1t Is I believe, h1s careful and astute 
cultivation and adroit use of connections."^ Later In the book, 
Mazllsh reveals his thoughts as to why Nixon selected Kissinger
I
for NSA. Other qualities that made Kissinger an attractive 
candidate are mentioned, but listed first and foremost, was,
t
"...he was a Rockefeller man. Nixon was obviously delighted 
to take him away from Rockfeller, an added Insult to the refusal 
to give Rockefeller a place 1n the cabinet. * The picture drawn 
by Mazllsh seems confusing. The careful and astute cultivation 
of connections that led to Kissinger's rise to power hardly seems 
consistent with an "out of the blue" appointment meant to anger 
Kissinger's patron. In any event, one must strongly question whether 
or not the position of National Security Advisor, an extraordinarily 
powerful one 1n the Nixon administration, was chosen to any 
s1gn1f1canl|idegree on the basis of giving one more good twist to
to Rockefeller's tail. It was simply too important to be 
guided by such considerations.
Nixon's appointment of Kissinger was a surprise but one 
that seemed logical once people began to look at how similar 
their philosophies were, lheir working relationship during 
Nixon's years In office was amazingly good. For Mazllsh to 
be wondering about this decision seven years later and for him 
to present Kissinger's selection as he does, makes this writer 
feel that Bruce Mazllsh is jealous that a man so much like 
himself could be "President for Foreign Affairs" while he, 
himself, remains behind in academia.
Referring to the time beginning with Kissinger's 
induction into the army, Mazllsh suggests, "Henceforth, that
12
life was 1nterw1ned in one way or another with the military."
Later he adds, Kissinger's entire career has been advanced in a
13
largely military setting." Given the fact that this is not a 
ration that would see these two assertions in a positive light,
1t would be strong evidence that Mazlish is taking a low blow 
at Kissinger 1f these assertions are not accurate. Mazlish 
states that Kissinger rode to the top on the coattails of powerful 
men. The two most crucial patrons in Kissinger's life were 
Richard Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller. Neither could be 
accurately described as "milita"y men." Mazlish takes the low 
road of tapping his reader's negative images of German 
militarism in a way that would generalize to Kissinger.
Perhaps the most outstanding example of Mazlish's jealousy coloring 
his judgment is when he Implied that Kissinger married his second wife
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in order to secure a more staid image. In Professor Mazllsh's words:
"Kissinger's swinging image helped carry him to 
the position of Secretary of State, but once he 
was in that dignified office, it clearly became 
a disadvantage. As we all know, shortly after 
h1s appointment Kissinger married Nancy Sharon
Maginnes,14
The man that made peace in Vietnam, for which he was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize, and the opener of the door to China hardly needed to marry 
1n order to solidify h1s position.
It was important to indicate to the reader that Professor Mazllsh 
may have carried many biases Into h1s book because there is a large area 
of utterly subjective decision-making Involved In this work. Interviews 
that cannot be Inspected, the use of Freudian psychology to analyze 
Kissinger's personality and terms such as "Americanization", that have 
Idiosyncratic mean1ngs,make Imperative a close examination of how 
Mazllsh deals with h1s material.
The difficulty of collecting Information on a person during h1s
lifetime can be vexing. Mazllsh offered his interviewees anonymity as a
means to elicit candid Information. This is a relatively common practice
and 1n the case of a man of Kissinger's power an almost necessary one. It
does, however, prevent the kind of access to h1s sources that one might
desire. The upshot 1s that, as Mazllsh puts it:
I must violate the Scholar's standard means of 
substantiating his statements: footnotes citing
the references, which any Interested reader may 
then verify for himself.*5
The use of Freudian psychology in the Mazlish book forces considerable 
reliance upon Interviews.
Given Freud's intense interest in childhood, it is difficult to 
believe that Mazlish could perform a legitimate analysis of Kissinger's 
life if he does not have reliable sources for Kissinger's
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early years. Louis and Paula, Kissinger's parents, were not
Interviewed. There Is no carefully drawn picture of Kissinger's
early life as 1s the case with Freud's biography of Woodrow
Wilson. Rich detailing is absolutely vital for the responsible
use of such Freudian terms as sibling rivalry.
In fact, Mazllsh described the relationship between Henry
and his brother 1n exactly those words. Mazllsh prepares the
reader to take h1s thoughts on the topic of Henry's relations
with Walter very seriously. "He is the silent presence, the
unspoken shadow, I believe, behind much of Henry Kissinger's
pattern of relating to other men, and especially to competitors
171n the larger sphere of the world." ' Referring to the two, 
Mazllsh tells his readers that, "strong sibling rivalry was in
i a
the air." One could ask if the basis of this observation
was an Interview with Walter. The source, according to Mazlish,
was “a trustworthy observer who commented that the two boys
10
'fought a lot.' To be sure, Mazlish sandwiches these daring
statements between disclaimers that it is all just speculation.
Speculation 1s fine but Mazllsh later operates on the basis of h1s
speculation as if It were fact:
...he never rose above Sergeant (his brother 
Walter, serving In the FarEast Theater, rose 
to be a Captain, a situation unquestionably 
bound to torment his older brother) . . . 2 0
Why his younger brother's rank should torment Henry is left to
reader's Imagination. Was there an Intense rivalry taking place
between the two? There 1c no evidence given 1n the entire
Mazlish book to validate h1s theory that Henry and Walter were
strong sibling rivals.
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The final point that I would like to make regarding the
analysis-by-interview technique is that ie did not interview
the subject of his book, Kissinger wotud not have been an
accessible man to interview, particularly for Mazlisb, since
his was a personality s t u d y . T h e  fact that he did net
receive an interview does not ruin the book. However, it is
hardly a positive factor. Mazlish boldly claims, though,
'...that the book was better, more impartial, for my not having
22
been exposed earlier to Kissinger's charms." The large
areas open to interpretation in the Mazlish hook could have
benefitted greatly by direct contact with the subject. It is
regretable that the interpretive sections based on Freud,
such as the sibling rivalry question, were not exposed to
Kissinger to observe his reaction (or perhaps to fall under
the weight of more complete information). Mazlish, of course,
rules out the latter as a possibility:
In sum, I would go so far as to say that 
I "know" Kissinger better now than does 
any single friend of his or person whom I 
interviewed, and perhaps better than 
Kissinger knows himse1^  I hope the reader 
will be in the same position at the end of 
of this book.23
It is generous,but absurdrfor Mazlish to hope that his readers would 
come to know Kissinger better than he knows himself through the 
reading of a book. The claim that Mazlish does would be sufficiently 
difficult to substantiate.
The mere fact that Mazlish does not quote a single family 
member is damaging more for the claims that he makes than for
- 17-
the actual absence of the interviews. Writing about sibling
rivals or "sublimated sexual desires" cannot, as a rule, be made
by laymen through third persons. ' To make them the jumping-
off point for theories that are touted as the explanations
for actions taken much later is dubious, at best. Mazllsh has
neither the information nor the training for such analyses.
Much of the Mazllsh book deals with Kissinger in terms of
h1s personality. Mazllsh has chosen to lift out the main themes
that comprise Kissinger's world view and tries to relate these 
, 2$
to elements in his personality. Without specifically stating
his reliawc* on the theories of Sigmund Freud, Mazlish makes use
of psychoanalytic terminology. The relatively short opening
chapter of Mazllsh's Kissinger cites Freud or his followers no
less than five times. There is consistent use, throughout the
book, of terms such as "Oedipal struggles" 26 and "sibling 
27
rivalry". He also attempts to show that Kissinger's drive for
m
power was based, 1n part, on h1s "sublimated sexual desires."
Despite the high value that Freudian psychology places on tbe
first few years of a person's development we find that
Professor Mazllsh Includes scanty factual materials in h1s brief
account of Kissinger's early life. One of the few topics from
this period of Kissinger's life that Mazlish does examine is
Henry's sociability. Mazlish pictures Kissinger to his readers
as being active, a leader and even, to use Professor Mazllsh's
20
words, had "earned a reputation as a skirt chaser." All of 
which fit neatly into the package of Henry Kissinger as Americans 
had come to know him during his years In Washington. One might 
question whether or not Mazllsh is looking at Kissinger's chlld-
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hood with 2 0 /2 0 hindsight. Dana Hard relates a young Henry 
completely at odds with the one Mazllsh portrayed. As Ward 
puts 1t, "All who knew the family 1n the German years recall 
that Henry was even then a loner, withdrawn and timid. The 
basis for Ward's view of Kissinger 1s well cited and 
explicitly Identifies Kissinger's father and a boarder of the 
Kissingers' during Henry's developing years, named Jack Helman.
This kind of contradiction of Mazllsh's presentation of supposedly 
factual material calls Into question his grasp of Kissinger's 
early years, the key to any Freudian-based analysis.
More specifically, this writer will catalog a few extremely 
questionable applications of Freud given by Mazllsh. Mazllsh 
attempts to base h1s theorized sibling rivalry between Henry 
and Walter on the fact that Walter's birth meant that Henry's mother 
was forced to quit nursing him before he was ready to stop suckling. 
This is the classic Freudian etiology of a child's jealousy that can 
develop Into sibling rivalry, The reader should note that this 
simply prepares the ground and does not mandate a significant 
sibling rivalry. But did Mazllsh continue with more evidence 
1n order to nail down his case? The reader must have surmised 
by now that Professor Mazllsn did not. Further, there Is the 
assumption that Paula Kissinger actually nursed Henry. Mazllsh, 
himself, admits that he has no proof to support this assumption.
What then, should Mazllsh's readers think of this passage? There 
Is the usual talk about this being speculation but Mazllsh floods 
h1s readers with so much speculation and so little fact that 
1t 1s difficult for the reader to keep track of which 1s which 
over the course of three hundred pages.
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Freud theorized that similar names may sometimes allow a person 
to transfer some of his feelings to a new acquaintance that he 
had held toward an earlier friend. Again Mazllsh draws on a 
Freudian construct but uses It 1n a setting that does not 
correspond to that of Freud. A comparison of the uses that these 
two made of the value of a common name and Its utility 1n terms of 
a transference of Identity should make this point clear. In the 
Freud and Bullitt book on Woodrow Wilson there 1s an 
explanation of why Wilson chose to have himself called Woodrow 
(his middle name) rather than Thomas as he had previously. The 
cause was an effort to win a cousin 1n marriage that failed. Her 
last name was Woodrow, which was also his mother's maiden name.
In effect, he sought that perfect woman who could replace his 
own mother. Falling to capture M s  mother representative In the 
flesh, he chose to have himself Identified as Woodrow, thus 
Internalizing the mother figure that he needed. One need not 
agree with this analysis. The point Is that a very close relative's 
name was made the calling card that stirred Wilson to propose 
marriage to h1s cousin. Key characteristics to note are that the 
name came from a person he knew quite well (Ms mother) and who held 
tremendous meaning for him. Mazllsh takes the Idea and applies 1t 
1n the following manner:
The name Kraemer, Incidentally, means "grocer" or 
"General Store" 1n German, and Is often a Jewish 
name. There was a Kramer 1n the Furth community, 
known to the Kissingers, and this In a subtle way 
may have served 1n making Kraemer qnacceptable 
transitional figure to young Henry.3®
How was this Kramer known to the Kissingers? Mas he a close family 
friend? One tends to believe that he was not because Hazllsh 
would have been pleased to lend more credibility to his account 
1f he could have 1n any way. He see that Freud made use of M s  
name-person transference 1n a much more conservative fashion than 
did Hazllsh.
The Incident that Hazlls* used this transference to explain
was Kissinger's meeting with Fritz Kraemer. The effort to Invoke
Freud was entirely unnecessary In this case because much more
significant Identifications were readily available. Both Kraemer
and Kissinger were recent exiles from Germany enlisted under the
flag of a nation fighting their Fatherland. Both were non-
comlssloned officers and could only have been pleased to find
another man with the same kind of heritage. What need Is there to
resort to pseudo-Freudian methods to explain Kissinger's Interest
In Kraemer when the common-sense answer 1s so near at hand?
Kissinger's mentor during his senior year at Harvard was
William Elliott. Elliott was an active Intellectual— he had
been a Rhodes Scholar 1n M s  youth. Hazllsh describes him as
34having pursued the Renaissance man Ideal. Elliott's nickname 
of "Wild Bill" brought forth the following passage from Mazllsh's
peri:
"Wild Bill" also has a cowboy connotation- 
one thinks of Wild Bill Hlckock— and
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Kissinger's later fantasy of being a lone 
cowboy riding tnto tom, as in his Failed 
Interview, nay derive In part from this 
Inspiration.»
Again, If one were to take Mazllsh at exactly M s  words there 1s
little enough to complain about hsre. The Fallac! gaffe "may",
*
though not necessarily, "derive 1n part" from the advisor's 
nickname. The statement Is so qualified as to be rendered 
meaningless, which makes one question why, 1f all the qualifiers 
were necessary, It was Included at all. Moreover, this 
Invocation of an advisor's nickname from ten years before to 
explain a foolish statement lacks any supporting evidence. It 
Is simply another attempted use of a Fruedlan technique that 
leaves the reader questioning whether or not Mazllsh 1s making 
a serious assertion or merely "speculating."
This writer's comnentary offered alongside examples of 
Mazllsh's use of Freud may have Intimated to the reader that I 
am a staunch defender of the Austrian. There are severe 
constraints 1n my belief In the validity of Freud In twentieth-century 
America. Some of his logic 1s compelling and some 1s not but 
there are valid and valuable uses to be made of Freud's theories 
In biographies. This writer will provide what he feels to be an 
example of a profitable use of the Freudian approach. During the 
above-mentioned Failed Interview, Kissinger makes the kind of 
word choice that could easily have lent Itself to a Freudian 
analysis. Kissinger 1s no fool and realizes that the American 
public greatly prefers heroes from Its heritage to those of 
Kissinger's past. During the Interview he was coding his thoughts 
1n terms that were consonant with his public Image but as his
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amotions rose during the Interytew, his ability to properly
package his Inner feelings as they emerged was Impaired. To get
Kissinger to admit that he was single-handedly responsible for
many successful diplomatic events meant that Fallacl penetrated
the outer gate of public humility so necessary for the
perpetuation of Kissinger's "correct" Image. Kissinger was slow
In slamming shut this gate and thus we have the opportunity to
observe him In a state where his normal cognitive control was
nearly obviated by emotion, "...Well, yes, I'll tell you. What
4
do I care? The main pot?.t arises from the fact that I've always
3|
acted alone." Here, the gate had swung open wide and Kissinger 
embarked upon h1s famous Imagery where he was, "the cowboy leading 
the caravan alone...the cowboy entering a village or city alone
3l
on h1s horse." In the midst of a beautifully chosen metaphor 
conjuring up Images of the old West, one sees the word caravan 
1n reference to what almost every American would have called a 
wagon train. A passing familiarity with Kissinger's writings 
or speeches would show that he Is quite capable of the most 
subtle manipulations of the English language. His slip was 
caused by emotion overpowering his Internal "editor" and 1t 
Indicates exactly the fact that Kissinger never fully "Americanized." 
Caravan 1s a European word and its selection points to Kissinger's 
European heritage. The Inference to be drawn from this point Is that 
Kissinger actually conceptualizes things 1n terms of his past. He 
synthesizes,even to this day and at a rudimentary level, a great
deal of h1s GermaMc/European heritage Into M s  American Identity. 
Does this use of Freudian analysis leave the reader cold or does 1t 
point out the value that attention to details such as word
selection can be of real benefit to a biographer?
One would be hard pressed to make the argument that Henry 
Kissinger 1s not Important enough to warrant the kind of detailed 
work Involved 1n a psychohistory. As the principal shaper of 
American foreign policy from 1969 through 1976, Kissinger was In­
volved 1n the opening to China, the negotiations that eventually
became SALT I and II and the peace settlement In Vietnam. Few
American Secretaries of State have aroused emotions to the same 
pitch, 1n both extremes, as has Henry Kissinger. Interest 1n the 
person, then, 1s definitely present.
This Interest has led to almost exhaustive Investigations of 
certain segments of Kissinger's life. From the probably apocryphal 
links between Kissinger and Kubrick's Strangelove until M s  last 
day In Washington, Kissinger was a man that aroused Intense study. 
This Is quite beneficial because any form of psychological study 
thrives on enormous quantities of Information. One could ask for 
oetter coverage of Kissinger's pre-Washington life, however.
There 1s such an Intense focus 1n modern mass media on the present 
that there never seems to be sufficient time to examine the past 
record. To such men as Stephen Graubard we all owe a debt of 
gratitude. In his Introduction to Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. 
Graubard explains that there 1s a real need for people to under­
stand what Kissinger wrote before he came to Washington. Far too
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tften the confidant and smiling roportor who brought the network 
news Into our living rooms did not have the slightest Inkling of 
what Kissinger had written or said about a topic before h1s 
%lect1ente National Security Advisor. Graubard's Kissinger: 
Portrait of a Wind recounts in fairly brief form much of Kissinger's 
Intellectual output. H1s analysis 1s fair-minded and does justice 
to Kissinger's work.
A plethora of Information becomes a hindrance when the 
Information 1s contradictory. "Facts" or what some writers 
consider to be such vary enormously. One wonders at times 
whether or not there were a number of different Henry Kissingers 
roaming about the world. Was he a brilliant high school student 
or a dull one; was he sociable as a youngster In Germany or was 
he a loner? Again, we must consider the points of view of the 
writers that are the sources for these facts and make judgments 
as to what was really the case.
Not unimportant have been the volumes that Kissinger himself 
has written. Hero, because of self-interest, one must be especially 
vigilant for the writer's biases. The opportunities to observe 
Kissinger that arise from h1s memoirs have been considerable. 
Interviews, like the one with Orlana Failed, are also rich sources 
of psychological material for analysis. Commentaries on 
Kissinger and his work have also been abundant sources to draw 
upon for both fact and Insight. There are few contemporary people 
that have written and have had written about them as much as 
Henry Kissinger.
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The major crises of Kissinger's life also provide a student 
of Kissinger with valuable material. The fact that Kissinger 
lived and developed 1n Weimar, Germany during the Nazi era can 
explain some of Kissinger's preoccupation with security 1n 
foreign relations. The journey to America and rebuilding lift 
In an utterly different environment brought its own tensions arid 
adaptations, too. The professional crisis In 1955, when Kissinger 
was not offered an Assistant Professorship at Harvard forced 
Henry to find new outlets for M s  talents. One of the judgments 
that this writer has made with respect to Erik Erikson is that 
he Is overly dependent on the idea of Identity Crisis. This 
does not preclude my drawing upon his theories where I find them 
to be applicable. Clearly there are limits to the inferences 
that can be drawn from crises but they allow us to look more 
deeply Into the personality of Henry Kissinger. Kissinger's life- 
crises provide ample opportunities to glimpse et whet mates M s  
"tick".
Sheer curiosity and Interest aside. It Is Important to come 
to a greater understanding of Henry Kissinger because of his 
personalization of foreign policy and negotiations. Following the 
dramatic visit to China by Nixon, the Soviets demanded equal 
treatment. Not only did they show heightened interest in a 
summit with Nixon, they particularly requested that Kissinger set 
up the advance work just as he had for the China summit. These 
two summits following so closely on one another, plus Kissinger's 
settlement in Vietnam, gave him tremendous negotiating prestige
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that paid dividends In his Middle East negotiations. The Middle 
East 1s an area where personalities play an unusually large role. 
Without doubt, Kissinger's ability to command respect and, In 
many cases, admiration created a situation 1n which h1s 
personality and presence were nearly indispensable. Kissinger, 
for his part, grew to have a great love and respect for some of 
the people with whom he dealt during these negotiations. The 
emotional tribute to Anwar Sadat that Kissinger includes in 
volume two of his autobiography, Years of Upheaval, appears to 
be geniune. Such an important interaction between the 
personality of a negotiator and the success of his diplomatic 
efforts bears close scrutiny.
There are siAie principles to which a psychohistorian should 
udhere. The ability of Freudian analysis to pierce through the 
many layers of defenses an individual has erected does not exempt 
it from suspicion. A good rule of thumb In a science of such 
great subjectivity 1s that when 1n doubt about a conclusion, do 
not make it. Verifiable insight 1s one thing but there are 
Innumberable examples of a writer supporting a pet theory by 
stretching psychoanalytic tenets around their hopes instead of 
reality. Eclectic use of the various points of view 1r. 
psychology seems of value. Doctrinaire reliance upon any single 
facet of psychology cripples one's explanatory powers. Finally, 
psychobiographers must take care not to commit the same error 
that historians have for years, Over-interest In external factors
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should not be paralleled by an a11>consum1ng examination of just 
the Internal elements of the subject. Erik Erlkson warned of 
exactly this type of reaction by pointing out that without the
external situation being ripe for a reformer, Luther would have
IP
been an unimportant figure. The contribution that psychology 
can make to understanding the behavior of Important men does 
not detract from the value of the historical, environmental side 
of the equation.
One final point to touch upon Is the question of what the 
writer can do when the evidence 1s weighed and all explanations 
seem Inadequate. When the tools available, recurring 
developmental and cognitive patterns and Implicit psychology, 
do not render a clear judgment what then? People do not always 
behave In a purely logical fashion. Our theories try to 
account for this but sometimes they cannot resolve Issues to 
our satisfaction. A writer must deal with the minutiae of h1s 
subject's life because exactly these details can hold the key 
to otherwise Inexplicable actions. Awareness of short term 
stresses In the person's private life and even of the Influence 
casual acquaintances may have (1n the short run) are potentially 
vital to solid analyses. To summarize: the level of analysis 
must be very detailed without losing sight of the larger field 
of vision necessary to build theories that can explain the 
majority of the behaviors and motivations that compose an 
Individual's life.
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Information on Klssingar's early life 1s often very contradictory.
Kissinger chooses not to devote time 1n his autobiography to this
period of his life, thus, forcing reliance on other sources. The
bane of psychobiographers, contradictory "facts," rears Its ugly
head at this point, Bruce Mazllsh describes Kissinger as a social
39
butterfly even during his years In Germany. His citation 1s not
as convincing as Dana Ward's source, Jack Hainan. Helman boarded
with the Kissingers during the period under discussion and
characterized Henry as "withdrawn, studious and a dreamer. ®
Professor NazHsh postulates a slumbering Kissinger suddenly
stirred to life by Fritz Kramer. Although this writer does not
wish to downgrade the Impact that Kramer had on Kissinger, it 1s
Infinitely more reasonable to take both Kissinger and Kramer at
their words, to the effect that there were other, more Influential
people 1n Kissinger's life. Long-time Kissinger acquaintance,
A?
Stephen Graubard, saw a more steady Intellectual development.
This development Included a very solid record 1n high school and 
Kissinger's selection Into the elite Army Specialized Training 
Program.
Barely Into the topic, extreme differences In 
Interpretations on material that should be primarily factual 
have manifested themselves. Such evidence has been weighed on 
the basis of what might be termed a form of the reasonable man 
doctrine. Preference has been shown for sources that are 
traceable and who had considerable first-hand contact with the
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subject. Moreover, we chose to consider It more likely that 
Kissinger followed relatively typical patterns of development.
This latter assumption 1s subject to change, however, as we 
trace Kissinger In his journey through a number of major life 
crises.
By all accounts Kissinger's father was a quieter, more 
Introspective person than was h1s mother. The deteriorating 
domestic situation for Jews 1n Germany caused Louis Kissinger 
to lose his teaching job. Louis was not able to rise above 
the day-to-day situation and see that vigorous action was 
Imperative. Fortunately, his wife, Paula, did and made 
arrangements for their emigration. What Impact did this series 
of events have on Kissinger who, at age fifteen, was no longer 
unaware of many of the events surrounding him? How did this 
alter h1s Image of Ms father's competence? Eventually, 1t must 
have dawned on Henry that he could easily have come to the same 
end that befell Ms thirteen relatives that stayed behind In 
Germany.
This affords the perfect opportunity to observe the Inter­
action of external and Internal events. Kissinger's Intelligence 
and Interest 1n learning pushed him toward academia. The feelings 
engendered by Ms Intellectual father's potentially disastrous 
Inactivity drove Kissinger to avoid acceptance of a passive life 
In academia. The ground was ready for a man like Fritz Kramer 
to cultivate 1n Kissinger a form of an active-intellectual Ideal. 
Mention has already been made of the fact that William Elliott,
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Kissinger's advisor, was a Rhodes Scholar—a Renaissance man.
We see In Kissinger a pursuit of the activist elements 1n h1s 
mother that saved the family from annihilation 1n Germany.
These are the Internal, personal manifestations that Interacted 
with the expanding role of American academics during the post- 
World War II period. Kissinger edited Confluence, an Inter­
nationalist magazine, while he was still an undergraduate. He 
was also director of Harvard's International Seminar during this 
period. Thus did Kissinger develop an Interest 1n the active 
side of Intellectual life. Again, to parallel Erlkson, without the 
money, from such sources as the Rockefeller brothers, that 
opened the door for Kissinger's entrance into active policy­
making what good would have come of the lessons that Kissinger 
drew from the differing reactions of Ms parents toward the rise 
of the Nazis?
Kissinger has attempted to maintain an active life and thus,
continues Ms rejection of the passive Intellectual role model
that his father provided. His rejection of his father's Jewish
orthodoxy 1s yet another facet of their relationship. Kissinger
became quite a skeptic and according to the New York Post series
of articles by Ralph Blumenfeld, Kissinger hid not darkened the
43threshold of a church for almost thirty years (this In 1974).
Age and the confidence that success has brought Kissinger have 
produced a rather marked rapprochement with Ms father and Ms 
religious beliefs. The money from the Nobel Peace Prize 
awarded Kissinger and Le Due Tho was used by Kissinger to set up
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a scholarship fund which was named for his parents. The rejection 
of h1s father's orthodoxy also seems to have lessened. Kissinger's 
emotional visit to the holocaust shrine In Israel and h1s 
willingness to have his children taught the tenets of Judaism 
are cases in point.
Kissinger's relationship with his mother Is the compliment
of the pattern that he had with h1s father. Her energy and ability
to see the onrushlng storm of extreme ant1-Sem1t1sm must have
Instilled 1n young Henry a tremendous amount of respect for Ms
mother. The New York Post series on Kissinger states that Paula
44was not as orthodox as Louis. Henry's lack of Interest In 
Judaism may stem from a rejection of his father and the religion 
that had brought such hardship on the Kissinger family. This 
tendency, to reduce the value of religion, follows the pattern 
of Kissinger losing some respect for Ms father and his views.
Particularly Important to one analyzing Henry Kissinger Is 
his unwillingness to talk about Ms childhood. In Kissinger's 
own words, (Furth, Germany)*1eft no lasting Impressions.. .that 
part of my childhood 1s not a key to anything."’ ® The work of 
men like Freud and Erikson Is built upon exactly these 
"unimportant ; years. Kissinger was raised 1n the heart of a 
nation that threatened to unbalance the entire power structure 
of the world, was a member of that nation's most oppressed group 
and was eventually driven from his native land, and yet he claims 
that It was not a significant period In Ms life. Freud found 
that unreasonable gaps In knowledge "must be treated as
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significant repressions." For Kissinger to claim that his first
fifteen years were not a key to his development 1s an excellent
example of the type of repression to which Freud was referring.
Is there any connection between Kissinger's seemingly
unnatural fear of a conservative reaction to our departure from
Vietnam (that he at times felt might lead to a rightist putsch)and
being a witness to the rise of Adolph Hitler? In a background
briefing at San Clemente on June 26, 1970, Kissinger referred
to the student protests 1n the following fashion, "Upper middle* 
class college kids will not take this country over. Some more
primitive and elemental forces will do that 1f It happens..."4'
Kissinger's next comments made clear that the elemental forces
referred to were the conservative right. Is 1t too great a leap
to understand that Kissinger's past made this possibility all too 
real for him? It 1s far more reasonable for us to see Kissinger
as repressing the nightmare of his childhood In Germany than that
h1s childhood was not Important.
More concrete evidence of this repression lies In his
behavior during his term as sn »4n1n1$trator during the occupation
of Germany. By all accounts, Kissinger was able to deal with the
people under h1s control without succumbing to bitterness and
vengeance for the acts perpetrated on both himself and perhaps more
Importantly on his dead relatives. Kissinger was able to split
the German people Into two camps—those that had been guilty of
actual war crimes and those who happened to be Germans and had
not taken part 1n these crimes. Kissinger's explanation was simple:
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Not vengeance. I felt to the olsmay of my 
family that If racial discrimination was 
bad yls-a-vls the Jews, It was bad vis- 
a-vis the Germans. I.mean, you couldn't 
blame a whole people.48
We have, then the Interaction of h1s ability to repress the un­
pleasant events of his own childhood and the admirable amount of 
empathy required for him to understand that not all Germans were 
9u11ty. These two combined to make Kissinger's a benevolent 
administration and. moreover, a man that felt he was uninfluenced 
by his pest.
This kind of repression fits Freud's thinking but more 
Importantly It fits well with Kissinger's ability to overlook 
unpleasant occurences. We are all capable of forgetting unhappy 
events; Kissinger showed a great ability to put aside enmity when 
necessary* TMs does not contradict the vast number of stories 
of Kissinger's petty rivalries and desires to revenge some rather 
trivial slights. When put Into a position where he could exercise 
his will. Kissinger has frequently been utterly ruthless. This 
was a different area, one In which direct revenge was not 
available. An example would be Nixon's well-publicized anti- 
Semitic remarks that Kissinger showed a remarkable ability to 
Ignore. The much more traumatic evants of his childhood were of 
the same nature. With no direct outlet for memories that were 
too painful to allow a conscious role, Kissinger chose to repress 
the memories of his youth that played such an Important part 1n 
hi s development.
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Kissinger's first Important governmental post was during the Kennedy 
administration. He had very limited dealings with Kennedy personally 
but 1t was a good position from which to advance. Instoad, Kissinger 
eventually resigned. Observing Kissinger's development from a 
Washington, D.C. washout to a successful bureaucratic infighter 
should help us to understand more about him.
Bruce Mazllsh sees this change as a major developmental point 
1n Kissinger's life. I will argue that, In fact, Kissinger was 
unsuited to a subordinate's role but was unusually capable as a chief 
advisor. The greatest triumphs of Kissinger's life came when 
he acted alone (note that he alluded to this In the Fallacl 
Interview). The China trip, Vietnam negotiations and Middle East 
shuttle diplomacy were all one-man shows. Examples of Kissinger 
working well with superlonor with close partners are 
comparatively rare. This pattern holds from when Kissinger was 
a loner undergraduate writing his thesis through his dominance of 
the Harvard International Seminar and up to h1s appointment to NSA 
and as Secretary of State. His failures, when placed In a position 
where working with co-equals was a must, follow a similar pattern. 
Kissinger's relationship with Robert Bowie was an example of 
Kissinger's Inability to deal with the role of a closely controlled 
subordinate. Their stormy relations were the cause of Klsslnflir's 
resignation from the Center for Foreign Affairs. H1s later 4pc1s1on 
to resign from the Kennedy administration parallels these 
difficulties with Bowie. Harvard's refusal to offer Kissinger a 
tenure-tracked position after he received his PhD further clarifies 
his difficulties when placed 1n an Inferior position.
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Kissinger's stay In Csaetot m t o-ly stout on* yeer long.
Hn served under the Ntxon-ford atortnlstratlen for eight yesrs. 
Although I am willing to grant that Kissinger developed Ms 
personality during tho In tori* period, ho did not have any 
significant opportunity to develop skills as a bureaucratic 
Inflgbter during tills period. NazHsh affords no explanation 
as to hoi* Kissinger nos gaining bureaucratic expertise when he 
was net actively Involved. More Important was the amount of power 
and Influence that Kissinger had 1n the Nixon atollnlstratlon.
Hh11e Ms access to Kennedy was very limited, he saw Nixon dally 
from the first. If one holds the ear to the President, one hold: 
power. Kissinger was always an astute manipulator of power and 
he proved 1t repeatedly during his second stay 1n Washington.
It Is less a tribute to Kissinger's ability to grow and learn 
then It 1s to his lifelong skillful use of power.
Kissinger had an Incredible string of successful ventures 
that catapulted him Into prominence. The simultaneous 
disintegration of the Nixon government created a situation whore 
1t was 1n Nixon's and perhaps our nation's Interest to allow 
Kissinger to become an unusually powerful Secretary of State.
There was as question in ford's mind that Kissinger needed to stay 
ee as Mo secretary of State. Again, we observe tiiet the 
ceeist Hy pf m eewnt Is rarely attributable to Me factor.
AeiHsh and many ether psychobtographers fall prey to toe desire 
to ample** outcomes in terms ef personalities alone, ieo can 
gins Kiereger credit far development in toe Intervening years 
without detractisg from the facts that external circumstances
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fav>.red Mm by putting Kissinger in a dominant position as Nixon's 
chief foreign policy advisor and then by making Mm a valuable 
prop to a falling regime. When the Vietnam settlement came under 
fire, Kissinger began to encounter some very rough sledding. 
Certainly his popularity plumneted end no one can be certain that 
Ford would have retained Kissinger had he been re-elected. Ms 
fall would not have been attributable to a loss of bureaucratic 
skills but, Instead, to a changed set of circumstances.
Let us complete our overview of Kissinger's life by asking 
the question "why did Kissinger write Ms memoirs?" The 
motivation for an Individual to write memoirs varies from such 
considerations as money to politics. Kissinger's memoirs, 
however, are rather peculiar because they are so exhaustive (and 
exhausting) and yet they contain no Information on the period 
of Ms life prior to his Invitation to come to Washington with 
the Nixon people. His German origin Is touched upon only 
tangentially and Ms personal life 1s given no Important 
consideration either. The Intense defense of his own policies 
and the rationalizations employed at times to accomplish this 
end leave me convinced that Kissinger wrote mainly to justify 
his life's work. H1s need to justify his work 1s based on 
uncertainty that he will be recognized as the great man he so 
desperately wants to be.
Some extraordinarily powerful men have been quite insecure. 
Examples range from Napoleon to Stalin and, I will submit, to
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Henry Alfred Kissinger. Kissinger spoke of s kind of transcendent 
graat man that could create order out of the chaos that 1s the 
world around us. His career In government service was dedicated 
to forming a new, more stable world order that would help the 
world survive 1n the nuclear era. His position, that of a 
European American, gave him the feeling that he had a unique 
contribution to make In the formulation of our foreign policy.
He has written a number of times that h1s European heritage 
has given him Insight Into the tragic element of history of 
which most Americans are completely unaware. He aimed very high 
1n his goals for himself and one of the prices for achieving such 
difficult objectives was tMt failure was quite possible. Because 
of this, 1t Is not 1n the least contradictory that Kissinger felt 
he was a kind of unique historic personage and that he be 
Insecure simultaneously.
If Kissinger considered himself <o be a hero 1t could only 
have been 1n terms of Ms contribution to foreign policy. H1s 
contribution came on two fronts. The first was Ms Intellectual 
output 1n the form of books and articles. His most popular book, 
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, was torn apart by many reviewers 
and Kissinger himself later recanted significant parts of Ms 
theory of limited nuclear war that formed the heart of the book.
It was a start that gave Ms career a big boost but It was not 
something that provided him with pride and confidence In his 
Intellectual work. H1s other books were solid but not of the 
quality to make Kissinger the undisputed leader 1n his field.
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The second channel for Kissinger's creative energies was In 
his role as a poltcy-maker. He could point with pride to the 
mjor Milestones of Ms years In MbsMngton, D.C. Few would 
debate that Kissinger had Inpact bet that Is Insufficient to 
qualify Mm as the kind of hero that Kissinger desired himself 
to be. The entire set of Kissinger's Msnelri are filled with 
attempts to cover or justify errors and to glorify the 
highlights of Ms years 1n power. Criticisms of Kissinger's 
work frequently met with a violent reaction on Kissinger's part.
0versens1t1v1ty to criticism 1s often a strong Indication that 
an Individual 1s Insecure. Evidence of the over-sens1t1v1ty that 
Indicates Kissinger's Insecurity 1s In order. Kissinger refused 
to submit Ms written work to the scrutiny of anyone other than 
his own chosen editor during his time with the Council on Foreign
AO
Relations. As previously mentioned, Hue!ear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy received some rather hostile reviews. Kissinger's reaction 
to Paul Nitze's review was a one hundred page letter justifying 
views that Kissinger later came to reject. This one hundred page 
letter was accompanied by a threat to sue for libel 1f the review 
was not altered. 1® Later, this writer will explore the 
connection between Kissinger's oversensitivity to criticism of 
work that he had Internalized (such as Ms writings and policies) 
and his reactions or overreactions to such criticisms.
The value of an observation 1n the personal sphere that might 
otherwise be of only passing Interest 1s shown here because 1t 
carries through to his official acts as a representative of the 
American people. Kissinger perceived an enormous quantity of
- 39-
*■
events as. threatening to American security. Mention has been made 
of Kissinger's fear of a rtghtest push for power tf the retreat 
from Vietnam was not handled carefully, His attitude toward the 
civil war 1n Angola Is anotiter example of fear that seems beyond 
reasonable limits. Speaking of the Cuban Intervention In Angola, 
he termed 1t "a blatant threat to International security.1181 fear
and Insecurity In Kissinger's personal life have deeply Influenced 
how he sees contemporary events 1n International relations.
Kissinger sees his worth as stemming from his contributions 
toward a new world order. When assaults on his Intellectual 
creations confronted Kissinger with the possibility that he might 
not be the hero he felt that he sould be, he overreacted. Mill we 
observe the same sort of overreaction to an assault on jHs policies? 
Kissinger desired to be considered a great man so badly that 
assaults upon his means of achieving this goal caused him to go to 
almost any length to restore his hopes for greatness.
Me have already seen that Kissinger received personal credit for 
such policy coups as the two suamlts and the Vietnam settlement.
H1s personalization of American foreign policy allowed Mm to 
chase Ms dream of reshaping the world after his own desire and 
views; Identifying himself with these policies allowed Mm to 
hope that he would achieve his goal--to be an historically great man.
The famous nuclear alert of American forces during the 
denoument of the 1973 October war has been the subject of much 
debate. Leaks of the alert created a difficult position for 
Kissinger during a press conference on October twanty-fifth. H1s 
reaction to probes, about the alert being an effort to prop up the
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Prestdent after the uproar over tha Saturday Night Massacre, 
brought forth tha following from Kissinger, "It Is a symptom of 
what 1s happening to our country that It could even be suggested 
that the United States would alert Its forces for domestic reasons."** 
This writer understands that Kissinger needed to deny this accusation 
as a natter of course but the emotion that he displayed shows a nan 
becoming very Motional over criticism of Ms course of action. 
Kissinger describes his reply (the one just quoted) as being 
rendered "rather heatedly." This aplsode contains most of the 
elements set out In the discussion of Kissinger's overreaction to 
criticism of Ms written work. These were decisions that Kissinger, 
not Nixon, made and their object was to blunt a perceived threat 
to Kissinger's carefully constructed balance 1n the Middle East.
The Soviets threatened to Introduce troops to protect the 
Egyptian Third Army. The American reaction (the decision-making 
body was chaired by Kissinger) was to go Into a state of nuclear 
readiness.
Kissinger's reaction can be analyzed on two fronts. To preserve 
what he felt was a favorable situation, he was willing to threaten 
the Soviets with nuclear war. Has this a rational response to a 
Soviet ability to Insert five thousand troops Into an area that
already contained hundres of thousands of troops or was Kissinger
S3responding to an attack on policy that he had Internalized? A 
reasonable question to ask that follows this line of reasoning 1s
41-
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•Can America afford to allow one nan sufficient power ovar 
foratfn policy that ha can throaton tha existence of tha nation 
for tha aaka of hta polteles?"
Kissinger's sensitivity at tha prasa conference,1n which 
ha haatadly dan1ad that ha had bahavad In an othar than 
objective and rational manner In upgrading our forces' alart 
status;becomes more Interesting. H1s self-righteous airs during 
tha prass confaranca wara not matched by an equal ability to handle 
tha questions of tha prass. K1ss1ngar promised to deliver facts 
at a later time that would wipe out these accusations. These 
facts wara never released and It makes one ponder the possibility 
that Kissinger scraped by a tight moment through a promise of 
classified materials that he knew ha would not be able to deliver. 
On the whole, this ploy succeeded as tha press took a wait-and- 
see attitude.54
One way to help validate a conclusion or theory 1s to show
some form of consensus. This parson's thinking on the topic of
Kissinger's Identification of value through the twin elements of
his policy-making and his Intellectual output was spurred by
0av1d Landau's Kissinger: The Uses of Power. Although this writer
has broadened tha Identification-Insecurity theme and applied 1t
to major events 1n Kissinger's Ufa, some of the main outlines are
provided 1n the following section from the Landau book:
At the heart of Ms behavior was that absurd 
combination of arrogance and Insecurity, of 
outward Insolence compounded with Internal 
self-doubt, each feeding the other to 
produce 1n Kissinger a sense of massive unease.
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He mis quick to fool Insulted, and equally
Sick tt wound otters In turn. Ha fait Ms tellect bound Inextricably to Ms 
personal tty, and sonatinas Inferred that „  
a ertttetan of ana uas an attack on both.
Fro* the days when Kissinger was an undergraduate and held forth
at length in gatherings of Ms pears right up until the present,
observers of Kissinger have noted his arrogance end at the sene
tine his vulnerability/Insecurity.
An extranely Interesting manifestation of this 1s Kissinger's
penchant for threats of resignation. When Kissinger was working
directly for Nelson Rockefeller, lack of access to Rockefeller
made Kissinger feel less valuable and his response "was to march
Into Rocky's office and resign."** The source for this was the
Blunenfeld series on Kissinger published 1n the New York Post
exactly one day before the public resignation threat of Kissinger
1n Salzburg. There are a number of other occasions that Kissinger
resorted to resignation threats, making consideration of his
motivation for this behavior Important.
The link, between Kissinger's Insecurities and overreactions
on one hand and his threats to resign on the other, 1s a direct one.
It parallels a person's self-deprecating remarks when looking for
compliments. By presenting his superior with a situation In which
he must either reject Kissinger or let him have h1s way (or perhaps
just to etrokeMs ego a bit) leaves Mm no choice If he values
Kissinger.at all highly, One may observe this pattern repeatedly.
The situation that led to Kissinger's resignation threat at Salzburg
was the question of his role In wiretapping members of his staff.
Kissinger was being given a rough time of 1t In the press and he
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reeponded by escalating the attention Into tuck a Mgh-cost 
sttuatton (through bit threat of resignation} that responses from 
Ms superiors 1n the S m ti nor* tonodlate and completely reassuring. 
The Sonata had a posolutlon In support of Kissinger on tho floor 
with fifty-one cosponsors within two days of tho pross conforonco.
Tho furor dtod out and Kissinger had boon pivon a public Infusion 
of pralso to help him overcome tho criticisms of tho pross.
Having just completed a fairly 1n,*erent1a1 analysis of Kissinger, 
lot us examine him from a more comaon sense, Implicit point of view 
on another of Ms character traits. Without question, his ability 
to grow and learn has allowed him to make some significant 
adaptations to his environment. Kissinger's early years In Germany 
witnessed the evolution of the Nazi state and with 1t the develop* 
ment of a system of restrictions on Jews that called for tremendous 
adaptability. Kissinger has recalled that even after Ms arrival 
1n the United States he would cross the street whenever he saw a 
group of boys coming along his side of the street. 7 This kind of 
automatic response to the Nazi years was extinguished by life In 
America but one can glimpse some of the changes wrought by growing 
up 1n a Nazi Germany.
Professor Bruce Hazllsh notes the fact that Kissinger was a 
58quick asslmllator. Ms early Interest In soccer was complemented 
with the development of a strong Interest 1n baseball. To this 
day, Kissinger 1s an avid New York Yankees fan. Other adjustments 
Included Kissinger having to work during the day and attending school 
at night 1n order to supplement the family Income. Louis Kissinger 
was never to re-attaln Ms social or economic position 1n ti.v United 
States. The picture that one sees 1s that of an Immigrant struggling 
to find some modicum of success 1n a new and strange land.
A development of trout moment to Kissinger's 11ft ms h1s shift 
tn alltftone# to tho Unttod Stotts. Ht had boon In America for 
about four years prior to tht time wbtn ht ms drafttd to fight 
his pathtrland. Mazllsh makes a cast for tht "Americanization" of 
Klsslngtr that ossums that tht proctss ms nearly completed during 
this tint. Rmaamber, also, that Klsslngtr's actions as an administrator 
of occupied Gtnaany showed none of tht rancor that so many of h1$ 
fallow officers had when put In charge of the 6erman population. 
Furthermore, Kissinger took German mistresses, drove a Mercedes and
eq
was quite content living In h1s old homeland. Having constructed 
a case for Kissinger's assimilation, Mazllsh then posits an 
Identification with the enemy hypothesis to explain these facts.
Here again 1s evidence of Mazllsh's over-infatuation with elegant 
psychological theories. Much more sensible Muld be an argument 
that sees Kissinger as Integrating his German past Into a newly 
evolving American Identity. H1s empathy for the numerous Germans 
that had suffered and sacrificed much during the Mr may have had 
no sinister implications as Professor Mazllsh Implies in h1s book 
on Kissinger. Kissinger simply carried his past with him when he 
went to fight the Mr 1n Europe.
The ability to manipulate people can be an Invaluable skill. 
Kissinger has demonstrated considerable talent 1n this field. The 
stories are rife about Kissinger abusing the members of his staff 
with ovenvork. His rationale m s that If he put 1n sixteen hour 
days why shouldn't they? The staff that Kissinger assembled for
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the National Security Advisor's position was deap In talont but 
Klsslnfar d«sandad too Much of Many canters of his staff, many of whon 
rostfnad bacausa of haalth or narltal dlfflcultlas (I an not, 
of course, referring to non like Anthony Lake who resigned over 
policy differences). Kissinger also ruthlessly Manipulated Ms 
wife. She devoted iwrself' alnost totally to the furtherance of
Kissinger's career only tn have him "treat her as a maidservant."60
Given the limitations of a work of this nature, the best
source from which to observe Kissinger manipulate people 1s 1n 
Ms writings. In justifying his "backchanoels" with a number of 
countries, Kissinger criticized State Department officialdom 
extensively. The reader of Kissinger's memoirs accumulates a 
negative picture of the men from Foggy Bottom until suddenly there 
1s a comolete about-face. 1 As Kissinger approached the period 
of Ms holding the Secretariat of State he began to describe these 
same officials as very competent Individuals. The criticism 
shifts, Instead to the need for an overhaul of the American policy­
making machinery. Once Kissinger was at the helm there was almost 
no criticism of this department. Kissinger, like many other 
persuasive authors, Interprets events 1n favor of the side he 
desires to prevail.
Bpyond the simple level of factual Interpretations, one can 
occasionally catch Kissinger grasping for his reader's heartstrings.
It was not unusual for Kissinger to remark that the ant1-war 
protestors had no monopoly on the anguish caused by the war. Stealing 
his opposition's thunder was a technique that Kissinger greatly 
favored. Examples range from Ms pre-emptlye concessions style of
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negotiating to the Salzburg press conference where he called 
for a full investigation of his acts, perhaps the most important 
attempt to manipulate his reader's emotions was in his opening 
paragraph on the Vietnam war. It embarks upon this controversial 
subject with the following sentence, "I cannot yet write about 
Vietnam except with pain and sadness." He proceeds with a surgeon 
like examination of the Nixon policy toward Vietnam. There 1s no 
objection to an unsentimental analysis of Vietnam from this quarter. 
There Is, however, an objection If Kissinger Is appealing to h1s 
reader's sympathy as the means to promote his arguments. Although 
there Is no direct method to prove this assertion, one can point to 
the fact that Kissinger's arguments are the same he made all 
through his years In office: the conduct of the was was simply
designed to preserve American credibility and avoid greater 
domestic discord, it seems worthy of comment that the Nixon- 
Kissinger years 1n office saw nearly as many Americans die In 
Indochina as during all of the previous years of American Involve­
ment In Vietnam. Nearly one-half of the Americans killed 1n the 
war died to save the honor of the first half and 1n the end South 
Vietnam fell almost as soon as Americans stopped fighting 
Vietnamese battles. Kissinger's explanation of his role In policy 
decisions does not shad light on h1s moral anguish; there 1s, In 
fact, remarkably little Insight Into what the war meant to 
Kissinger personally. On this basis and on the basis of 
observations of Kissinger throughout h1s memoirs, this writer 
concludes that h1s chapter heading and opening sentence on the 
war were efforts to manipulate his readers.
♦7
Ths source for the consent, that the job of « diplomat 
is to He abroad, ts lost. Kissinger, tt would be fair to say,
Is a very skillful dtplomat, Many would accuse fCtsslnger of 
playing domestic politics with his "peace is at hand" announce­
ment Immediately prior to the 1972 elections and of lying to 
place himself In the position of influencing the elections. This 
writer has examined Kissinger's explanation of the events that 
transpired 1n the period from October through January and 
frankly can come to no absolute conclusion as to whether or not 
Kissinger was lying to the American public. Kissinger's account relies 
greatly upon the North Vietnamese realizing that they would have 
to deal with Nixon and that he would be most tractable before h1$ 
election had been sealed. This Is consistent with previous North 
Vietnamese diplomacy being geared to the American domestic 
situation. However, this does not explain North Vietnamese willing­
ness to settle 1n January when It had become clear that Congress 
was beginning to severely limit Nixon's ability to wage the war.
The difficulty that Kissinger's argument has In explaining this 
paradox strengthens the decent Interval argument. This 1s the 
point mentioned earlier, that a psychobiographer must admit that the 
signals are too confused to claim a clear understanding. This 
writer can only state that he suspects Kissinger of some wishful 
thinking because of the great benefits that were h1s if peace 
really were at hand. To say more would be to violate the reader's 
trust and confidence, both of which are vital 1n a work with as 
much subjectivity Involved as In psychobiographies.
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There are, however, some rather clear-cut examples. of 
Kissinger lying or at leait of htn conveniently forgetting tone 
significant, but troublesome, facta. Part of Kissinger's 
reputation for greatness came from his ability to achieve the 
seeming Impossible. For a Rockefeller man, who was on record 
with a negative appraisal of Nixon, to have been chosen out of the 
blue to the NSA post was exactly the kind of material that Kissinger 
loved to present about himself. He goes Into detail, In Ms 
memoirs, about Mitchell asking "Whet have you decided about the 
National Security job?" with Kissinger's response being to the 
effect that he did not know he had been offered a job at a ll.63 
Kissinger also stated 1n the Failed Interview that "1 had never 
approached him (Nix™) when he offered me this job."6*  Kissinger's 
description 1s so dramatic that 1t made this reader a Mt skeptical. 
Apparently, the skepticism was deserved as the Nixon memoirs give 
a much different description of the selection of Kissinger. Nixon 
claims that Kissinger had been supplying Ms campaign with Inside 
Information about the Vietnam negotiations from September 12 
through October 12, 1968.65 Nixon's flat assertion, that Kissinger 
had rendered his campaign a valuable service, 1s much more 
convincing than Kissinger's efforts to paint Ms rise as the 
product of a miracle.
Kissinger's description of Ms return to Europe as the National 
Security Adviser 1s Important because 1t shows Ms extreme ambivalence 
about Europe and because of the opportunity to observe him In a
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Freudlan^tyle -'nnlal, Newly tnatal lad tn a position, that 
Kissinger has dascribed at ona of th* jaoit powerful In tha 
world, ha returns to hts homeland. What are the Motions that 
he records as having fait at the moment of his triumphant 
return to Europe? Kissinger's words are Important enough to 
quote at length,
I found myself anticipating our next 
days with eagerness. I was of course 
returning to the continent where I 
was born; but the real reasons for my 
Interest were the geopolitical 
realities and historical ties between 
countries sharing similar histories, 
values, and Institutions.66
To review some of Kissinger's past: his family had been chased 
out of Germany, many of his relatives killed by the Nazis and he 
had emigrated to the United States in the 1930's. Twenty-one 
years later he returns as the key advisor to the most powerful 
Individual In global history. His retelling of this moment 
allows almost no personal satisfaction or pride 1n his rise from 
Immigrant to National Security Advisor. Kissinger 1s not as 
humble a man as this would lead one to believe.
Proceeding to an analysis of this attempted denial of a 
moment of supreme personal triumph 1t Indicates that Kissinger 1s 
trying to hld&hls true amotions. Kissinger had no desire to 
portray himself as an egotist. There was no mention made of 
his pride In returning to h1s homeland as such an Important 
figure. More than this, however, was at work. Kissinger denied 
himself the glories of a triumphant homecoming because It would 
have entailed an admission of the tragedy of his chtldhood and 
reawakened his guilt over the flight from Germany that spared
him hut left to their fit* hi* thirteen relatiye*. Kissinger 
consistently refute* to ipHi of hi* childhood and deni** it *  
importance for th* mm  roiions, It it a coanon himn trait to 
deny negative past avtntt and to refuse to recognize th* sources 
of our own insecurities. This does not prevent one's behavior 
from being Influenced by these insecurities. Kissinger denied 
th* personal satisfaction that was natural to feel in order to 
avoid the reeMorgonce of his unhappy days In Germany.
Late in his life Freud Introduced th* concept of a life and 
death instinct. Eros, th* life instinct, tended to unify and 
extend things In a simulation of the growth typical of an 
organism.1' Th* other half of Ms dualism was a death Instinct, 
often referred to as thanatos. Its drive was toward splitting 
or disintegrating its object. Each Is a source of energy that 
motivates an Individual.
Henry Kissinger witnessed th* destruction of his world as a
child. His reaction to these events has been a wide rang* of
creative behaviors that spurred his rise to power. From th* young
1nm1grant to NSA, Kissinger has shown a remarkable ability to grow.
His efforst to bring the two antagonistic sides In the Middle East 
together Is one example of energy expended to unify disparate
elements. The Soviet summit with Nixon and th* SALT process Itself
are further cases of Kissinger's professional efforts that derive
their vitality from the eros Instinct.
His energies have also been directed toward the diminution 
of processes that could only be described as driven by thanatos.
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The materiel t t it i  «nd drain from Vietnam via eroding American
strength, dally. Eyen aore important m s the interne! division that
the war m s  widening. Hi may choose to belteve t ilt  Kissinger's
f u r  of a r ig h tis t  takeover In thts country m s  far-fetched but
that f u r  provided tnpetus for hln to try to put an end to the M r.
The impact of Watergate on the authority of the President ms also
a source of concern for Kissinger. In his words, "One cannot have a
crisis of authority In a society for a period of months without
aspaying a price somewhere along the line." As Nixon became a Maker 
figure of authority, Kissinger grew In strength. He, not Nixon, 
put American forces on alert during the October War. Many of hi* 
actions were Intended to allow the American public to su  a 
distinction between what Nixon did In the crumbling domestic 
scene and Kissinger's actions in the foreign policy of this nation.
The perception that Kissinger has of himself Is certainly that 
of a man contributing to the growth and development of society.
His description of the benefits of the Chiu Initiative 
had a far deeper significance^ *The agony of Vietnam seemed to 
bring on a despair about the possibility of creative policy, an 
abhorrence of foreign Involvement, and 1n some quarters an 
Insidious self-hatred." The reader should note the use of the 
possessive form In Ms description of the policy and also his 
description of that policy as crutlve. He saw his efforts, In 
the positive step of dullng with China, as helping to combat the 
negative impact of the Vietnam debacle. This is exactly in
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keeping with, the duality that fraud postulated In Ml Ufa and 
death tnsttnets,
Kissinger attrthutad Mi Motivation for entering public 
tervlce at follows, T  had entered government with tha hope that 
r could help heal tha icMsms In my adopted country by working 
to end the war. ® His actions were Intended, even if they did 
not always turn out as he wanted, to rebuild America. He 
frequently refers to his "adopted country" In an almost 
mothering way. As one of her leaders, he Included himself 1n 
this statement, "the qualities required for leadership are 
primarily creative: to set the framework within which 
administration will then operate."7* He see, then, that Kissinger 
reacted to his past In an Innovative and creative fashion.
H1s growth has been astounding, as has been Ms adaptability.
The roots of Ms growth and adaptability He 1n a reaction* 
formation to his early environment.
Kissinger's Interest 1n great men 1s understandable In light 
of the discussion of his feelings that he Is a member of that 
group. It Is not unusual for memoirs to Include numerous 
vignettes of Important men. Kissinger has not been one to bring 
his personal life Into his memoirs, however, there are a number of 
careful descriptions of men Hkedmfiaulle and Mao that are 
products of Kissinger's preoccupation with greatness.
Kissinger's description of Mao 1s almost haglologlcal. He 
relates the bearing of this man to his readers with a sense of 
awe at having been with Mao. Kissinger seems to believe that
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great nan have a tort of physical "presence" that dominates tha 
air around than. In this instance, Kissinger puts it in tha 
following fashion; "ha dominated tha room—not by tha pomp that 
1n most states confers a degree of majesty on the leaders, bu£ 
by exuding in almost tangible form the overwhelming drive to 
prevail."*z Even the decrepitude of Mao's old age did not rob 
him of this ability. In Kissinger's eyes. Unquestionably Mao was 
one of the great men of the twentieth century and Kissinger is 
quite right to note this fact but we will observe that, for 
Kissinger, this "presence" is almost an operational definition 
for greatness.
Kissinger negotiated more with Chou En-lal than Mao. Again,
the flavor of Kissinger's words help bring to life h1s fixation on
greatness, "Chou En-lii, in short, was one of the two or three most
Impressive men I have ever met. Urbane, Infinitely patient,
extraordinarily Intelligent, subtle, he moved through our
discussions with an easy grace that penetrated to the essence of
our new relationship as If there were no sensible alternative."*3
As for Kissinger's Interest In a form of presence, "He moved
gracefully and with dignity, filling a room not by Ms physical
dominance (as did Mao or de Gaulle) but by Ms air of controlled
tension, steely discipline, and self-control, as 1f he were a
74colled spring." Again, one observes Kissinger describing an 
almost mystical power that great men have.
Perhaps the most Impressive of the "great men" that Kissinger 
singled out for further discussionCharles de Gaulle. The
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heading under which. Kissinger wrote about the General was entitled
"The colossus of do daunt," Kith the certainty of a metronome,
Kissinger rofloctod upon do Gaulle's Impact on the assemblage,
"HI* presence at tho recaption tondorod hy Nixon was so over­
whelming that ho was tho cantor of attention wherever he stood."*5
later ho adds that "One had tho sense that if ho moved to a
window the center of gravity might shift and the whole room might
tilt everybody Into the garden."*5 Tho fascination of tho men
of do Gaulle's stature was explainable In terms of Kissinger's
need te have a standard by which to measure himself. Particularly
In the de Gaulle section, this standard could almost have been
physical. His description of the General's non-verbal behavior 1s
extremely Interesting. The following exchange between Kissinger
and de Gaulle should shad more light on what the writer Is Indicating:
De Gaulle considered this Invitation (for 
Kissinger's opinion) so astonishing that 
In preparing himself for the Impertinence 
of py opinion he drew himself up to an even 
more Imposing height. "I found 1t 
fascinating," I said. "But I do not know 
how the President will keep Germany from 
dominating the Europe he has just 
described." De Gaulle, seized by profound 
melancholy at so much obtuseness, seemed to 
grow another Inch as he contemplated me with 
the natural haughtiness of a snowcapped.
Alpine peak toward a little foothill.”
Repeatedly Kissinger took note of the physical factors Involved In the 
presence of a man he considered great. An Intangible factor;that
Kissinger alone defined;was the standard of measure. Earlier
discussion has shown that Kissinger felt a strong need to be
considered a great man. His definition was self-serving 1n that It
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WM hutd upon a quality noted tn ht» hy other*. Mazlish frequently 
jeentloned Kissinger's "weightinass" and explained the term to mean 
a kind of abiltty to Impress other people. 8 Kissinger's need for 
achievement was thus met through his careful definition of success.
One constantly recurrtng crtticism of psychology is that it 
does not explain human behavior in a simple formula that allows 
predicttlon of future behaviors. The picture I have drawn of 
Henry Kissinger is that of ai< intensely driven individual with 
an unsentimental approach to life. Were I to omit events that 
do not "fit" with this thesis, It would be a violation of my 
standards of psychobiographical ethics. Kissinger has an 
emotional*human side of hie)that does not fit with the conception 
of him as a manipulator of people and as a court politician. One 
sparkling example of this Is to be found 1n the tragic period in 
our history whan a President fell from power. Neither 
Henry Kissinger nor Richard Nixon claim an Intense friendship 
for the other but they developed ties that were, 1n seme sense, 
emotional. They battled together to create a new world order 
and succeeded, to a degree, 1n their efforts to restructure the 
International scene. When Nixon's long domestic battle was over 
and he had resigned, there was one long-time member of the 
administration still at his side.
Kissinger gives the following account of the time 1mediately 
after Nixon's resignation speech, "I caught up with him 1n the 
passageway next to the Rose Garden. I said; 'Mr. President,
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after moat of your major speeches tn this office we have walked 
together back to your house. I would be honored to walk with 
you again tonight’ . * Here one catches a glimpse of Kissinger, 
the man, not the courtier, Clearly, there were other places for 
Kissinger to have been at this point in time but hi chose, for 
very human reasons, to remain behind with a man who was losing 
the very power that critics of Kissinger say was the only 
reason for h1s working with Nixon. This brief moment 1n history
4
encapsulates the contradictions present In Kissinger. Certainly, 
Kissinger was a power hun;r Individual who wielded that power 
ruthlessly but he also had a sentimental side to him that seems 
utterly contradictory to h1s realpolltlk philosophy. This 
seeming contradiction Is a function of Kissinger's own sense of 
the tragic and the fact that all people are human and have the 
contradictions Inherent In the species that can produce a 
Schweitzer and a Hitler 1n the same generation. Our Innate ability 
to be so many people Is one of the puzzles of psychology that 
remain unresolved.
Kissinger's almost unique combination of adaptability and
single-mindedness provided the means for his tremendous rise to
power. The drive stemming from his creative needs have pushed
Kissinger to such heights that the question asked by Orient Failed
In 1972 seams a good one to repeat at this time 1n Kissinger's life.
So at this point 1 ask you, Or. Kissinger, 
the same thing I asked the astronauts when 
they went to the moon: 'What next? What
will you do after the moon} what alsa can you 
do besides your job as an astronaut?*80
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Kissinger hecame quite adjusted to a life %f ponr and plnaur 
during Ms tine In office In thft period tin e  tH* t in  ha 
has boon involved tn tho creeds* of the dafewee of pel ides he 
implemented while tn off tee. Nhat I m drivtag«  1* * *  dotation 
of whet Kissinger will do eece he completes hts memoirs? No cae 
rationalize h1s activities to this point as active and creative 
in the sense that he is helping to justify and rally support 
around his new world order. Kissinger's ores-hosed need to 
create and grow will not leave him a happy individual If he does 
not provide an adequate outlet fcr its energy. Just as 1n the 
Failed analogy with the astronauts—"where do you go from up?" 
Perhaps Kissingar will remain fairly satisfied to bacon son 
form of elder statesnn available to any adminlitration.
However, this writer does not rule out the possibility of a 
return to power by Kissinger. On September third, Sol 
Llnowitz publicly suggested that Kissinger be appointed as a 
special negotiator to the Middle East. How Kissinger chooses 
to exercise or exorcise h1s Internal needs remains, of course, 
an open question but one worthy of a person's attention. Tin 
alone will provide the Information necessary to answer It.
PsychoMstories are delicate, but necessary, Instruments 
In the study of leadership. The dangers stenlng from subjectivity 
and the difficulties of nstering the two disciplines Involved 
force the reader to maintain vigilance. The potential benefits 
of an Insightful psychohistory justify this vigilance. The
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conceptual framework provided by psychology promotes meaningful 
analyses. Though a youthful science, psychology represents a 
tremendous leap forward from the days of simplistic. Implicit 
personality analyses. The contribution of psychology extends 
beyond the avoidance of past errors; It forms the basis of 
Intuitive leaps that restore order to the chaotic behaviors 
Inherent in man.
The need to understand the motivation of leadership has 
never been greater than 1n this time of a potential nuclear 
Armageddon. As a one-time possessor of this power and as the 
architect of American foreign policy for eight years, Henry 
Kissinger merits detailed analysis. The analyses just presented 
trace consistencies In Kissinger's life that span much of his 
personality. His Insecurities led to a fixation on achieving 
complete stability 1n foreign affairs. These Insecurities 
manifested themselves In his resignation threats and In him over­
reactions to relatively minor events In global politics (such as 
Angola). Psychology helped connect K1sr1, jer's traumatic early 
years 1n Germany with his later concern for stability. The very 
fact, that Kissinger refuses to speak of Ms early years and the 
guilt associated with Ms escape from the Holocaust, proved to be 
the link between the two. Kissinger's rise to greatness 
demonstrated Ms ability to adapt and grow. H1$ Insecurities 
demanded personal growth and some approach to greatness that
Kissinger satisfied with • self-serving definition of greatness. 
His preoccupation with greet men was the practical extension of 
H1s need to pacify Ms Insecurities.
The strains of untrained authors on a still-evolving science 
have produced some unfortunate psychohistories. However, by 
examining psychohistories with a careful eye on the author's
preconceptions, Ms grasp of psychology and the scope of the
work's subjectivity, the reader can attain a closer approach to 
reality than 1s possible without psychology.
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